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In this paper, we investigate the role of the components of demographic
change on economic development. Population growth has both positive and
negative eﬀects on income growth. Kelley and Schmidt (1995) states that high
birth rates are costly in terms of growth but this eﬀect can be oﬀset by a
positive impact of mortality reductions. We study how the weight of each eﬀect
has changed over time considering a panel of countries over the last four decades.
We ﬁnd that there is little gain to expect from further reductions in mortality
in developing countries, and that the eﬀect of birth rates has become positive in
developed countries. In contrast to the earlier study, where growth enhancing
eﬀect of population density is felt consistently for all decades, we ﬁnd that the
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11 Introduction
The ’rise of the population number’ is probably the most inﬂuential socio-economic
phenomenon since Malthus (1798) that has kept the ’population debate’ alive. The
debate centers around the exact sign and magnitude of the eﬀect of growth rate
of population on economic development. Disparities of conclusions still persist,
though a clearer picture has started to emerge from the recent research, especially
after 1990s. Notable contributions in this regard came from Kelley and Schmidt
(1995, hereafter KS), and Crenshaw et al. (1997) among others, who showed that
decomposing ’aggregate population’ growth into the components of demographic
change1 is crucial to understand the exact nature of its impact, viz., the sign of
impact on per capita income growth. Going by this line, KS (1995) explained why
dozens of studies in the last two decades ’failed to unearth a statistically signiﬁcant
correlation’ between the growth rates of population and per capita output. One of
the most important contributions of KS (1995) and later Crenshaw et al. (1997)
concerns about measuring the consequences of crude birth rate (CBR) and crude
death rate (CDR) reductions in developed and developing countries. Our purpose
in the present paper is to extend KS (1995) work and show how the weight of each
eﬀect (of CBR and CDR) has changed over time.
Considering the period (1960-1990), KS (1995) showed that high birth rates
are costly in terms of growth but this eﬀect can be oﬀset by a positive impact of
mortality reductions. The pattern that arises due to higher birth rates (in KS,
1995), is monotonic over time. A forecast based on the estimates of CBR in KS
would mean that higher CBR in developing countries would further reduce economic
growth. Crenshaw et al. (1997) also ﬁnd similar results: ’...an increase in the child
population hinders economic progress... .’ As the populaion number increases, one of
its most important eﬀects is perceived in higher population density over time. In the
growth theoretic set up, higher density of population induces higher innovation due
to population pressure and consequently hastens up economic progress. KS (1995)
found a signiﬁcant eﬀect of population density on economic growth over decades.
A comparative eﬀect of CBR can be matched by higher (lower) CDR in the both
the developed and developing countries. KS (1995) found that a decrease in CDR
fosters economic growth in the developing countries and that the contribution of
CDR reduction has declined monotonically over time.
To contribute to the growing literature on the eﬀect of demographic compo-
nents on economic growth, the main objective of our paper is to exhibit the changing
weight of the eﬀect of demographic change one economic development. Speciﬁcally,
we show that the eﬀect of CBR and CDR increase (decrease) has changed over time.
Using an up-to-date sample period (till 2000) and GDP per capita income com-
patible with purchasing power parity (in 1995 international prices), we show that
the weight of the eﬀect has changed over the last four decades. In contrast to KS
1The components of change refer to decomposition of aggregate population according to its
vintage group, e.g., crude birth rates and death rates for younger age (0-14), working age (15-65),
and retired cohorts (65+).
2(1995), we ﬁnd that there is little gain to expect from further reductions in mor-
tality in developing countries. Importantly, the eﬀect of CBR has become positive
for developed countries. In light of the current demographic transition and consid-
eration of ’zero population growth’ as optimum for higher economic prosperity in
the developed countries as held by some research2, the ﬁnding of positive CBR in
these countries calls for a rethinking on the population policy. Also in contrast to
KS (1995) we ﬁnd that the growth-enhancing eﬀect of population density is limited
to the 1960s.
Before we draw on the detailed ﬁndings of the paper, it is useful to have a sum-
mary view on the population debate. The summary picture would provide essential
information about the current state of population debate. To say clearly, the pur-
pose is to ﬁnd the exact direction of the trend, namely as of now what has been held
and concurrently proved about the eﬀect of demographic components on economic
growth. Three basic models have been propounded in the literature to explore the
economic-demographic relationship. These are: correlation approach, production
function approach, and convergence patterns model. While early empirical models
used to employ the simple but econometrically weak, correlation approach, recent
research extensively use convergence-patterns models which is built on the produc-
tion function framework. Section 2 is devoted mainly to critically review these three
models and the implications of their empirical applications.
The rest of the sections are organized as follows. In section 3 we discuss
the importance of the components of demographic change where we concentrate on
evaluating the short and long run impact of demographic components on economic
development. Section 4 outlines the model to be estimated and discusses the econo-
metric methodology to be used. Features of the data and design of the variables
are also noted in this section. Empirical results are presented in section 5. Section
6 concludes the major ﬁndings of the paper and discusses their implications in the
current development context.
2 Theoretical Structure and Evidences from the Liter-
ature
2.1 The constructs
Though recent endeavour showed that ’components of demographic change’ provide
deeper and clearer insight in explaining the dynamic relation between growth of
income and population, not very long ago, the contributory role of the latter was
underemphasized. Technological change3 tended to be used as the guiding force in
models of economic growth. Demographic factors were thought to be irrelevent to
the growth process, and hence the eﬀect of past and future demographic trends on
2See Boucekkine et al. 2002 for an analysis in this respect
3Some other variables were also used for explaining aggregate output growth, viz., human capital,
free market institutions, and budgetary disciplines.
3growth remained largely unexplored (Boucekkine et al., 2002). The recent theoretical
advances (e.g., Boucekkine et al., 2002), noted an exception to this trend, thanks
to the advent of new growth theory (viz., Lucas, 1988; Romer,1991) that initiated
research in this direction.
As per the current thinking, demographic factors are considered as much im-
portant as technological change for the analysis and modeling of economic growth.
Some authors (e.g., Simon, 1981; Todaro, 1989) argue that demographic pressures
would favorably inﬂuence the nature and pace of technological change and cause
higher innovation ultimately fostering economic growth. This logic, however did not
ﬁnd unequivocal testimony in the empirical literature until the last decade when the
role of demographic factors started to get rigorous treatment in economic growth
models as in KS (1995) and Crenshaw et al (1997). Though the theoretical rigor-
ousness has recently started to have momentum, the empirical foundation has not
been equally paced. Since the empirical formulation relies heavily on theoretical
constructs, it will be useful to describe in brief the three methods, viz., correla-
tion approach, production function approach, convergence-pattern approach in a
nutshell.
Traditionally, correlation approach used to be extensively applied in early
empirical growth models to describe demographic-economic interactions. The model
is described in Eq.1:
(Y/Ngr) = Γ1(XD) (1)
(Y/Ngr) is per capita output growth, XD indicates demographic variable(s) which
may include ngr, the contemporaneous growth of population (N), age structure of
the population, crude birth rates (CBR) and /or crude death rates (CDR), N and/or
population density, life expectancy, and migration. Performing investigation for
various countries4 over periods of time, several models during and before 1980s drew
on unconditional correlations between per capita output, (Y/N), and population
growth, ngr. Empirical results widely vary: some providing evidence of ’no measured
impact’ of ngr on (Y/N), many studies showing negative impact, and even some
providing evidence of positive association between the two.
The results from this approach are diﬃcult to interpret as it renders at best the
ﬁrst hand information on the eﬀects of demography5. Moreover, ngr is an aggregate
phenomenon and does not reveal anything about the speciﬁc channels population
aﬀects output growth. For instance, since ngr equals fertility rate minus the death
rate6, and given that an individual acts upon the economy’s resource diﬀerently over
his life cycle, it is instructive to segregate ngr into various components viz., young
generation, working age, and retired cohorts. Correlation approach does not lend to
segregation of demographic variables into various components. This feature is aptly
carried by convergence-patterns approach which we will discuss shortly.
4Mostly developing countries considering the spur of rapid population growth.
5KS, 2001 describe this as ’ﬁrst pass assessments’.
6the net migration rate may be added, but this has been suppressed in the empirical model of
this paper.
4Another way to explore the economic-demographic relationship is to use pro-
duction function framework (Eq.2)
Y = Γ2(K,L,H,R,A) (2)
Eq.2 involves lot of growth variables like physical capital (K), human capital (H),
technology (A), and natural resources (R), to explain output (Y). Data on these
variables are diﬃcult to compile and consequently Eq.2 is transformed into growth
terms for empirical convenience. Then, demographic processes are linked to the
growth of the factor inputs in the production function. Even though Eq.2 possesses
elegant analytical rendering, the empirical implementation of this model is limited
in scope. Some of the reasons are: estimates of capital depreciation and resource
depletion is diﬃcult to compile, technology and scale are elusive to assess and involve
lot of uncertainties (KS, 2001).
As we mentioned, the correlation approach does not provide any speciﬁc chan-
nel population aﬀects output growth, whereas production function approach suﬀers
from proper empirical implementation. The third approach, the convergence-
patterns or technology-gap model takes account of the drawbacks of these two
models and provide an exhaustive framework to explore the relationships between
economic growth and demographic variables. Basically the convergence-patterns
approach is based on the production function framework of Solow-Swan type. The
economic growth of a country in this approach is allowed to vary with the levels
of economic development. In this model initial endowments of the economy play
important role along with the demographic factors.
The idea of the convergence-patterns model is to study the pace at which
countries move from their current level of labour productivity to their long-run, or
steady-state level. The rate of labour productivity is assumed to be proportional
to the gap between the logs of the long-run steady state and current level of labour
productivity 7. Formally,
(Y/Ngr) = δ[log((Y/N)∗ − log((Y/N)] (3)
Here (Y/N)∗ is the steady state (Y/N). The greater this gap, the greater are gaps of
physical capital, human capital, and technical eﬃciency from their long-run levels.
Depending on country speciﬁc characteristics, the long-run per capita output growth,
(Y/Ngr) diﬀers across countries.
As reviewed in Dasgupta (1995), due to the poor resources base and lower level
of initial development, developing countries with persistent poverty are facing the
problem of catching up with developed nations. This idea is aptly captured in the
’convergence-pattern’ model as described above. As per this model it is known that
the relationship between per capita income growth, (Y/Ngr)t,t+n and the initial level
of per capita income should be negative (See Solow, 1956). Barro (1991) and others
in this regard, point out a famous empirical regularity: if countries are similar with
7We are using here the per capita output and per-laborer output interchangeably. For the latter,
it would have been written as Y/L, where L denotes labour. L= αN, where α is usually unity.
5respect to structural parameters for preference and technology, then poor countries
tend to grow faster than rich countries. Thus, there is an underlying force that
promotes convergence in levels of per capita income across countries.
In line with the construct of the convergence-patterns approach, KS (1995)
provided the following econometric model which has tended to be a bench mark
for subsequent research. Allowing the demographic processes to vary by stage of
economic development, KS (1995) describe the convergence-patterns model8 as:
(Y/Ngr)t,t+n = Γ3((Y/N)t,It,At,St,{(XD)t,t+n,(XD)t,t+n ∗ (Y/N)t}) (4)
Γ3(.) is assumed to be a linear function of the variables. (Y/Ngr)t,t+n, represents
per capita output growth, (Y/N)t is the initial level of per capita income, I variables
provide additional details on the ’initial’ state of the economy, for example, popu-
lation density. ’Density’ in the model (in the Boserup, 1965 tradition) is supposed
to have positive impact on (Y/Ngr). The resulting sign is the combined inﬂuence
of diminishing returns to land (which is negative) and positive eﬀects on technical
change, (At). From equation 1, the demographic variables (XD), include the con-
temporaneous CBRt,t+n and CDRt,t+n, as well as CBR lagged 15 years, CBR−15.
St variables represent factors inﬂuencing economic development as well as changes
in the stocks, for example technological change.
Theoretically, the inverse relation between (Y/Ngr)t,t+n and (Y/N)t is the
basis of convergence-pattern model. The interaction term, (XD)t,t+n ∗ (Y/N)t im-
plies that the eﬀect of population growth and its components are allowed to vary
by levels of economic development (Y/N). The competing hypotheses associated
with this are consistent with a declining (increasing) negative (positive) eﬀect of
population growth as the country develops. A summary eﬀect of CBR, CDR, and
CBR−15 in the model described above is in order. While a rise in CBR is harmful
for an economy as higher births prompt higher dependence on resources, a rise in
CDR enhances economic growth as resource dependence is reduced. Nonetheless,
this conclusion is subject to subtle evaluation as higher deaths of workers impede
economic growth while higher death of dependants stimulate it. The short-run and
long-run consequences of demogrpahic components will be described in the next
section. A state-of-the-art analysis of the the empirical ﬁndings based on the corre-
lation approach and convergence-patterns approach is presented below. Note that
since emprical investigation using production function approach are very sparse, we
concentrate on the other two approaches.
8Note that, while in theory all variables are measured in exact instant t, in implementation, the
measurement (of say, (Y/N)t,t+n) is over the period (t,t + n). Studies employ ﬁve-, ten-, 25-year,
or even longer periods (KS, 2001).
62.2 Facts from the literature - population and economic growth
nexus
• Empirical results based on correlation approach
Based on the correlation approach, Simon Kuznet’s empirical ﬁnding depicted
that there is in general a lack of correlation between population and economic growth
in the early 1970s. Documented in more than a dozen studies, ’such a (lack of) sta-
tistical regularity ﬂies in the face of strongly held beliefs by those who expect rapid
population growth to deter the pace of economic progress’ (Kelley and Schmidt,
2001). This is because, increasing population has been customarily regarded as
mere consumers of resources and that its faster growth is associated with dimin-
ishing returns to capital. Based on this strong prior belief, some research (e.g.,
United Nations, 1973), as reviewed by KS (1994) using international cross-country
data for the 1980s, found a negative association between population and economic
growth. As per this line of research, a high rate of growth can not be supported by
a corresponding increase in investment, thus lowering growth of per capita output.
Simon (1981) in his ”The Ultimate Resource” challenged this pessimistic view
showing that population growth was likely to exert a positive net impact on economic
development in many Third World countries ’in the intermediate-run’. In fact,
this ’revisionist’ approach of Simon (1981) changed much of the dogmatic thinking
of population growth’s consequence on economic development in the subsequent
years. He illustrated that the outcome of the population impacts on the economy
are likely to depend both on the time dimension of the assessments, and whether
feedbacks are included in the analysis. Feedback eﬀects arise, in the model, due to the
population pressure that would ultimately cause natural resource exhaustion. Going
by his illustration, it means, over longer periods most natural resource prices actually
declined. This happened despite the existence of rising demand from increasing
population because of price-induced substitutions in production and consumption
of natural resources, and an increase of supply due to technical advancement and
innovation. Hence the ’time dimension’ is important for these ’adjustments’ or
’feedbacks’ to be assessed, which arises due to population pressure. Density and size
of population are other demographic variables he included in his analysis.
Based on both the time series and cross-sectional data, the investigators of
National Research Council (NRC, 1986)9 put a rather balanced and non-alarmist
assessment: ’on balance, we reach the qualitative conclusion that slower population
growth would be beneﬁcial to economic development of most developing countries...
(but) there is no cause of alarm over the high rates being experienced there’. What
the NRC’s ﬁnding implied is that population growth has both positive and nega-
tive eﬀects, and ”given the current evidence, though the actual size of the impact
can not be determined, the direction of the impact...can be detected”. Since the
9The investigation purported for the economic consequences of population growth in poor coun-
tries, recognized that instead of regarding population growth as exogenously given, it should be
treated as a causal factor.
7sample considered by the council involved developing countries, a cautionary note
was always due as ’persistent’ high births10 in those countries negate the positive
feedback from the labor force. But since ’persistency’ of higher births is likely to be
attenuated in the longer run, youth’s dependency on resources will go down giving
rise to substantial contribution from the labor force.
Some other studies in the late 1980’s (Srinivasan, 1988; Kelley, 1988) found
that while slower population growth would indeed advance the economic well-being
of most developing countries, the size of the net impact would not likely be especially
remarkable by comparison with many other determinants of economic growth. Pre-
cisely, Kelley (1988) states that: ”economic growth ...would have been more rapid in
an environment of slower population growth, although in a number of countries the
impact was probably negligible and in some it may have been positive”. Kapuria-
Foreman (1995), in the more recent literature, found that there is in general non-
signiﬁcant correlation in cross country studies and a slightly positive causality from
population to growth while considering time series analyses. In a sense, though it
can be said that, research started in the 1980s ’revisioned’ a comprehensive develop-
ment in analyzing the impact of population growth mainly due to the consideration
of ’time’ dimension (i.e., modifying shorter-run direct eﬀects of demography with
feedbacks occurring in the longer run) and impact of separate components of de-
mographic change (births, deaths, age, size, and density), however, until the 1990s,
uncertainties remained concerning quantitative assessments of the impact.
• Empirical results based on convergence-patterns approach
Extending Brander and Dowrick (1994) and Barlow (1994) models11 KS (1995)
used the convergence-patterns approach (Eq.4) to explore the relation between eco-
nomic growth and demographic factors. Counting on the anomalies in the 1980s
KS(1995) posed the intriguing question: ”Has the impact of population growth
changed?” Putting it more speciﬁcally, ”Has the direction of the impact of popula-
tion growth changed over the decades?” Building on Barro’s (1991) core variables12,
KS (1995) have modeled aggregate population growth taking into account its dif-
ferent demographic components and answered the above question by untangling the
short- and long-run eﬀects of the components of demographic change. They distin-
guish between several alternative demographic inﬂuences on the economy’s potential
output in the long-run (e.g., the impact of population size and density), and timing
of demographic impacts (e.g., the timing of birth rate and death rate reductions)
which aﬀect both the short and long-run.
The central results in KS (1995) have been summarised in Section 1, however,
just to recollect the main ﬁndings of KS (1995), we summarise them as follows: (i)
10We explain this feature and its consequence more clearly in the next section.
11These models showed that past births contribute to current labor force and hence promote
economic growth, whereas current births impede economic growth due to adverse eﬀects on resource
base and thus on investment.
12The variables are age structure, life-expectancy, level of per capita income, level of education,
crude birth and death rates, etc.
8’A decrease in the crude death rate induces economic growth in developing coun-
tries’. (ii) Although death rate reductions contributed positively in each decade, this
contribution declined monotonically over time. (iii) Concerning the impact of birth
rates, KS (1995) conclude that the short-term costs of high birth rates increased in
the developing countries in the 1980s. For developed countries a diﬀerent picture
emerge: negative eﬀects of birth rate are found, the magnitude of which is large
in the 1960s and 1970s, but fairly small in 1980s. Nonetheless, the eﬀect of past
births are depicted to be small. Interestingly, the population pressure depicted by
’density’ variable is found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect output growth for all the decades
(1960-1990). The growth-enhancing eﬀect of density in all these periods mean that
increasing population prompt higher innovation and hence higher economic growth.
The result is found to be consistent for all the countries over three decades (1960-
1990).
Since diﬀerent components of demographic change exert varying eﬀects on
growth of income depending on the time proﬁle, i.e., on the short-run and long-
run consequences, a summary analysis of their impact in the following section can
explain the consequences of demographic change from development perspective.
3 Components of Demographic Change and Economic
Growth: Short-run and Long-run Impacts
3.1 Overview
Notwithstanding the standard explanation of aggregate output ﬂuctuation, research
in the last decades ( as summarised in the preceding sections) weigh heavily in favor
of demographic factors in order to provide an alternative explanation to economic
growth ﬂuctuation. Population theorists argue that demographic components, like
age structure and life expectancy rate remain much more stable over time while
technological changes, human capital, and budgetary disciplines involve lot of un-
certainties and complex methodological issues. Unlike the former, the short-run and
long-run impacts, which demographic components exert on the aggregate economy,
are more easy to be tapped and channelled into the economy due to the same reason
of less uncertainty and more stability. Taking the recent ﬂavor of demographic route,
it is getting increasingly acclaimed that population growth is the driving force of
growth in the economy.
Extant literature in economic growth is abound with numerous ﬁndings in this
regard. For instance, Boucekkine et al. (2002) argue that the eﬀect of population
growth on per capita output growth should be interpreted in the light of the vintage
structure of the aggregate human capital. Based on demographic shifts, the authors
provide explanation to the transition from a stagnant to a modern-growth economy
by noting that an exogenous increase in longevity leads to higher schooling time
and can induce an economy from a no-growth path to a balanced growth path.
Essentially this means that the short-run and long-run consequences of population
9growth depends on the growth of its vintage components (refer to equation 2).
That is, contrary to the orthodox perception of ’people being only the consumers
of resources’ (Crenshaw et al., 1997), the rise of the population number should not,
per se, be thought of retarding economic growth. The number may in fact spur
economic growth depending on the caveat of which ’segment’ of the population is on
the rise. A brief analysis of the dynamic consequences of population growth follows
next.
3.2 Short and long run impacts
We mentioned above that the dynamic impact of population growth on the growth
of per capita output depends on the vintage structure of population viz., the young
generation, the labor force, and the retired cohorts. The magnitude of short-run and
long-run eﬀects depends on the magnitude and pace of growth of these generations.
To start with, the growth in the number of children may impede economic growth as
scarce economic resources are invested in goods and services that yield ’few immedi-
ate economic multipliers’ (Crenshaw et al., 1997). But growth in the economically
active population, i.e., labor force, is rather beneﬁcial as it can propel economic
growth due to their resource creating abilities. Thus population policy aiming at
birth rate and mortality reductions will infuse short-run and long-run consequences
in the economy.
To be more clear on the timing of impact consider that higher births generally
add to the population mass of a country and that the short-run eﬀect of a birth is
likely to be negative13. This may incline a national government to adopt birth rate
reductions policies. This has an immediate positive short-run impact on growth since
it economizes on child-rearing expenses. In about say ﬁfteen years, the role may be
reversed as ’there will be fewer persons entering their productive work force years’
(KS, 2001). However, the dynamics due to birth rate reductions can be explained
in terms of the ’autocorrelated’ nature of past and current births.
A strong economic logic and empirical evidence follows this fact. Take for
instance, the case of developing countries. Current high population growth of these
countries is autocorrelated, implying that they experienced hight past population
growth rates. This observation has two-way eﬀects: On the one hand, the stock
of accumulated ’resource users’ shoots up over time exhibiting negative impact on
the economy, while on the other hand, as the new births in the past turn out to
be ’resource creators’ in the life cycle, accumulation of them in the economy in-
fuses positive externalities. In terms of time impact, population growth can have
short-run negative eﬀect on economic growth due to youth dependency, and long-
term positive impact resulting from labor force growth and a subsequent boost in
aggregate demand (Bloom and Freeman, 1998; Barlow, 1994).
Following neoclassical economic thinking, where a labor force growth is as-
sumed to be essential for economic growth, the positive correlation of labor force
13Because the children or young generation are net ’resource users’.
10growth and economic growth can be explained taking account of the scale and de-
mand eﬀects. Following Crenshaw et al. (1997), a growing labor force encourages
scale eﬀects in terms of larger domestic markets, a more complex division of labor,
a greater volume of diﬀused technology, and lower per capita costs of public infras-
tructure (e.g., roads and transports). Similarly, the demand eﬀects can be explained
using ’Kuznets cycles’ of U.S. economic history; increasing population has been as-
sociated with increasing production - the possible reason being increased demand
for consumer goods in the wake of family formation (Easterlin, 1968).
Mortality reductions, especially infant/child mortality, can have similar time
impacts as birth rate reduction. If mortality decline is concentrated among infants
and young children, this may create a baby boom in the initial years. Subsequently,
due to increased use of contraception, the consequent declining fertility generates a
large cohort of young people. When this cohort enters the labor force, it produces a
period of 40 to 50 years in which the existence of relatively high worker-dependent
ratio creates a potential boost to per capita income (Bloom and Canning, 2001).
Eventually, as the cohort ages, the eﬀect disappears, though it can still have notable
signiﬁcance while it lasts.
Population growth has also been explained in some recent studies (e.g., Nielsen
and Alderson, 1995) as generating income inequality in the long run. According to
them, rapid labor force growth deteriorates wage rates and generates inequalities.
As Crenshaw et al. (1997) put, to justify the logic of positive association between
labor force growth and economic development, it is necessary to have individual and
family adversity, sharp levels of income inequality, and declining wages in the face of
stiﬀ labor competition. Following Lewis’s (1954, 1958) two-sector model, the authors
explain that during early and intermediate stages of development, rapid labor force
growth boosts the proﬁt margins of the capitalists in the modern sector by reducing
the average wage levels. These proﬁts, in turn, get invested in the modern sector,
and productivity and hence the job opportunities improve in the long run.
Excessive population growth can also have a long term impact on economic
growth with respect to higher population density and size. In economic geography
literature, explanations have been put forward how density of population positively
aﬀects production and consequently aﬀect growth. In empirical growth literature,
models which explore density and size, in addition to population growth posit that,
population density and all components of demographic change exert signiﬁcant eﬀect
on output growth. They found that population density had a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect in 1960s and 1970s and the net eﬀect of all three components of demographic
change is negative, on average for all countries. However, a complete explanation of
statistically robust correlations between population growth and per capita output
growth, as summarised above, needed a complex and extensive statistical modeling
because of the anomaly in the 1980s due to world recessions, war, and droughts and
because of a possible association of negative consequences of population growth with
diminishing returns to capital and the environment (KS, 1995).
To summarise the discussions so far, the research investigating the impact
of population growth on economic development, have substantially changed over
11the years. From theoretical perspective, the formulation of population in terms
of vintage structure and studying its impact on the economy in an endogenous
growth framework (Boucekkine et al. 2002) is a major leap. A remarkable con-
tribution followed from KS (1995) in the empirical front; in line with Brander and
Dowrick’s (1994) tradition, KS decomposed the aggregate population into compo-
nents of change and laid the foundation for untangling the long-run and short-run
eﬀects of population growth on economic development using an exhaustive econo-
metric methodology. As pointed out before, extending KS (1995) work, in this paper,
we study how the weight of each demographic eﬀect has changed over time. In the
following section we describe the features of the data and methodological framework
used in this paper.
4 Methodology and Data
4.1 Methodology
The methodological framework described in this section heavily draws on KS (1995).
Since our purpose in this paper is to show the changing weight of the demographic
factors by extending KS (1995) data set till the current period, hence, the empirical
speciﬁcations as well as the econometric methodologies used by KS (1995) have
been retained in our investigation so that appropriate comparison14 can be made.
KS (1995) speciﬁed the following equation:
(Y/Ngr)i(t,t+n) = αi+ηt+β ln(Y/N)it+θIit+δSit+ς(XD)it+ξ {XD ∗ Y/N}it+εit
(5)
where εit ∼ IN(0,σ2)
Three empirical speciﬁcations (of equation 4 and hence equation 5), are used, each
one succeeding the other inductively following the addition of diﬀerent demographic
variables in the model. Speciﬁcally, we start with the simple model where per
capita output growth15 is explained by the log of initial level of per capita income,
the aggregate population growth, the density of the population, and the interaction
term, i.e., Ngr ∗ (Y/Ngr). Note that the variable, ’density’, has been entered in
each (of the three) equation as it represents the information about the initial state
of the economy and most importantly it captures the technological change concept
which is induced by faster population growth. In the next model, a decomposition
of Ngr, viz., CBR, and CDR, and their interaction terms are considered. The third
model is the most general one, where another demographic component, CBR − 15
is added to model 2 to take account of the net eﬀect of past births on the growth of
14The methodologies used in this paper can be substantially changed incorporating more time
series features in the framework and studying the memory property of the demographic components.
However, this exercise is reserved for future investigation.
15note that we do not refer here to the instantaneous growth, rather growth over period.
12per capita output. The empirical models derived from equation 5 have the following
speciﬁcations:
Model1 : (Y/Ngr)i(t,t+n) = αi + ηt + β ln(Y/N)it + δ1Ngrit + δ2(Ngr ∗ Y/N)it+
θ(Density)it + εit
(6)
Model2 : (Y/Ngr)i(t,t+n) = αi + ηt + β ln(Y/N)it + δ1(CBR)it + δ2(CBR ∗ Y/N)it+
δ3(CDR)it + δ4(CDR ∗ Y/N)it + θ(Density)it + εit
(7)
Model3 : (Y/Ngr)i(t,t+n) = αi + ηt + β ln(Y/N)it + δ1(CBR)it + δ2(CBR ∗ Y/N)it
+ δ3(CBR−15)it + δ4(CBR−15 ∗ Y/N)it + δ5(CDR)it + δ6(CDR ∗ Y/N)it
+ θ(Density)it + εit.
(8)
KS (1995) argued that the variables, CBR, CDR, and CBR-15, included in
the demographic models (as described above), are robust in explaining the eﬀect of
demographic component on economic growth, though several other ’extra’ variables
like primary and secondary enrollment rates, government expenditure shares, and
a proxy for distortions in investment prices, can be included in the model in line
with Barro(1991). However, as KS(1995) noted, inclusion of these ’extra’ variables
unnecessarily complicated their model and most importantly, their inclusion barely
changed the demographic coeﬃcients. In the present exercise, as in KS (1995) we
have used the same set of demographic variables. An importnat question arises
about the functional form of Y/N. Basically three types functional forms, viz.,
linear, log, and cubic forms have been used by diﬀerent authors in various studies.
Among them the log form of Y/N is chosen following KS (1995), as adjusted R2 for
log form was among the highest with no notable diﬀerences in demographic eﬀects
(KS, 1995).
We discuss now the method of estimation of the empirical speciﬁcation of the
convergence-patterns model (equations 5-8). αi and ηt in these equations denote
country speciﬁc and time speciﬁc intercepts. Depending on the assumptions made
about αi and ηt diﬀerent kinds of models could be generated viz., Pooled estimation,
Fixed Eﬀect Model (FEM) and Random Eﬀect Model (REM). In the empirical
growth theory, there are numerous applications and discussions about the relative
signiﬁcance of these methods. Speciﬁc discussions in this regard centered on whether
αi is properly viewed as a random variable (known as random eﬀect model) or
as parameter to be estimated ( known as ﬁxed eﬀect model). Nevertheless, the
application of these two methods (viz., FEM and REM) is sometimes limited by the
13choice of the economic model and intuition guiding the theory of speciﬁc interest to
the researchers.
REM assumes αi and ηt as random which are separate components of the
error terms. Though theoretically REM edges over FEM on eﬃciency ground, its
estimates may be biased if αi and ηt are correlated with independent variables, i.e.,
XD type of variables, and ln(Y/N) in our case. For instance, if natural resources are
a part of the individual intercept αi and are correlated with ln(Y/N), then use of
REM will result in biased coeﬃcient estimates. Moreover, FEM are appropriate if
individuals in the sample (i) can not be viewed as random draw of some underlying
distribution. It is the case here where i denotes countries. KS (1995) note that
FEM ’edges out REM in situations in which the sample represents a sizable pro-
portion of the population’, which is a feature of our speciﬁc case. Using Hausman
speciﬁcation test, the authors showed that FEM consistently dominates REM and
Pooled estimation methods employed in his study. Following KS, the ﬁxed eﬀects
method has been used for our purpose. Note that the most important assumption
on which panel estimation methods (FEM or REM) are based is the cross-section in-
dependence of observations. There is a growing literature in this ﬁeld recently which
considers ’dependence’ structure and not the standard ’structure of independence’
of observations in the model. Empirical applications of this new consideration is
rather sparse because it involves lot of methodological complexities. Nonetheles, the
’independence’ assumption is very standard in panel data literature and therefore,
FEM has been estimated for our empirical model based on this assumption.
Using FEM means inclusion of as many country intercepts and the determined
time periods intercepts in the estimation. The country dummies control for the
inﬂuences of per capita income growth, viz., cultural attitude or natural resource
base, which vary across countries but reasonably remain constant over time within
countries (KS, 1995). The time dummies control for period-speciﬁc and /or global
inﬂuences, for instance, the oil price shock in the 70s and recessionary periods (in
the 80s). Moreover, under the assumption of single intercept, we perform a ’pooled
regression’ (see Table 3). At the same time, to capture the separate eﬀect of each
decade, cross section regressions for four decennial periods have been performed.
The results of FEM (based on all models), Pooled, and Cross-section estimations
(based on Model 3) are reported in Tables 1 and 2.
4.2 Data
The estimation is based on the regression of 86 countries (63: developing and 23:
developed countries). Our dependent variable is per capita growth rate of GDP (at
constant purchasing power parity (PPP) at 1995 base). It is now widely recognised
that Real GDP per capita is the best indicator of a nation’s aﬄuence. We have
used real GDP given its standardization in 1995 international dollars that adjusts
for the actual buying power of national currencies, and excludes the factor income
from abroad (See, Summers and Heston,1994, and Penn World Table 5.1).
Data on population growth, the crude birth rate (CBR) and the crude death
14rate (CDR) have been collected from the US Census Bureau, while density, and other
relevant data have been collected from the World Bank Development Indicators.
CBR, and CDR are measured per 100 population, and density is measured per
1000 population. The available length of data is for 40 years, beginning from 1960
and ending at 2000. Note that data on these variables have been aggregated over
decennial periods keeping in mind the possibility of persistence and simultaneity
between the dependent and explanatory variables. Aggregating over longer growth
periods (say 10 year aggregation in our case), the diﬀerential Y/Ngr growth rates
can alter Y/N enough to inﬂuence substantially the pace of demographic change.
KS (1995) note that decennial periods embody more ’real’ demographic information
because lower-degree aggregation, say 5 years, rely on the assumptions inherent in
extrapolations between decennial censuses. Thus in the estimation we have four
decennial periods: 1960-70, 1970-80, 1980-90, and 1990-2000.
It may be mentioned here that per capita output growth, the dependent vari-
able of our model, is not an ’instantaneous’ growth rate. In the empirical litera-
ture, growth models often use ’growth over periods’ and not ’instantaneous growth’.
Hence confusion might arise about the calculation of the per capita output growth
rate in our model which is calculated as:
n p
(Y/Ngr)t+n/(Y/Ngr)t − 1. n, in our
case, is 10 years. To take into account the dynamic eﬀect of the birth rate, we have
lagged crude birth rate by 15 years, as netting out the eﬀect of lagged birth rate,
(CBR−15), establishes the signiﬁcance of labor force in the estimation and thereby
can reduce the magnitude of ’negative eﬀect’ of CBR in the estimation. Since de-
mographic data were unavailable before 1950, therefore, lagged values for CBR-15
for 1960s apply to 1950-55. Similarly for 1970s, it applies to 1955-1965; for 1980s,
to 1965-1975; and for 1990, it is 1975-1985.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Results of Panel and Cross-section estimation
The empirical results presented in this section are based on the methodological
framework outlined in Section 4. We consider a panel of 86 countries spanning over
four decades (1960-2000). The results can be studied from two perspectives: ﬁrst,
the ﬁxed eﬀect panel estimation results summarise the efect of each demographic
component over four decades. A pooled regression under common country intercepts
for all countries (both developed and developing) has been performed for model 3
(Equation 8).
Second, to perceive the separate eﬀect of these components in each decade
cross-section regressions of per capita income growth on demographic components
have been performed using model 3. Based on the estimates from these regressions,
partial derivatives of the per capita income with respect to each demographic com-
ponents have been calculated so that their exact eﬀect on per capita income growth
can be assessed. A conﬁdence band (±2σ) has been constructed for the partial ef-
fect of demographic components so that signiﬁcance of each eﬀect can be judged
15statistically. To provide credence to our ﬁndings, we have also performed parame-
ter stability test for all countries as well as separately for developing and developed
countries. As expected, the stability test results conﬁrms the consistency and invari-
ance of our results across time. A detailed analysis of our results and comparison
with KS (1995) ﬁndings follows next.
I. Eﬀects of ln(Y/N) and Density
To begin with, we ﬁrst examine the convergence-patterns hypothesis from our
estimation. The empirical relation between Y/Ngr and Y/N was described in the
preceding section (section 2). It was noted that Y/Ngr varies inversely with Y/N,
the initial level of per capita income. The negative sign of the coeﬃcient of Y/N
explains the the logic of the convergence patterns model. The relation has been
explored in three models (see Table 1), from the most restrictive to the most general
(Model 3). Restrictive (Model 1) in the sense that the demographic components
have been excluded in the model so that one can perceive only the eﬀect of aggregate
population growth and the state variable, the density of population in the model.
In Model 2 and Model 3, demographic variables have been inductively included (See
Table 1). Note that adding more demographic variables (in Model 2 ﬁrst and then
Model 3 for the most general one) increased the explanatory power of the model. As
expected, R2 is the highest with the most general model (Model 3 in Table 1). The
estimates of the panel estimation using FEM (Table 1), exhibit the expected sign
for the convergence pattern model, i.e., signiﬁcant negative estimates of ln(Y/N)
are observed in all the three models. Precisely, this vindicates the invariance of
’convergence’ hypothesis to the decomposition of aggregate population into various
components, viz., CBR, CDR, CBR−15.
Now consider the eﬀect of population density from our estimation. Contrary
to KS (1995) ﬁnding, where ’density’ exerted signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on per capita
output growth in all cross-sectional periods and across all models, we ﬁnd a varied
pattern in our estimation (See Tables 1 and 2). A siginicantly positive eﬀect of
density is found in our model considering only Model 2 (without CBR−15), pooled
estimation, and in the 1960 among cross section estimation (see Table 2). Though
our own estimation of KS model for three decennial periods (Table 6 in the appendix)
is very much in consonance with KS (1995), our new estimation with extended data
provide interesting evidence in that population density had positive inﬂuence on
per capita income growth in all the countries only in the 1960s. Over the next two
decades, the eﬀect remained insigniﬁcant, and most interestingly, it turned out to
be negative16 in the last decade (in the 1990-2000). Despite KS (1995) ﬁnding of
signiﬁcant eﬀect of density over all periods, the ﬁnding of no consistent eﬀect in our
estimation over the decades indicates that population density has not contributed
signiﬁcantly for innovation inducement and economic growth over the past four
decades.
16Despite showing insigniﬁcant negative sign, it can at least give indication of the changing pattern
of density eﬀect on Y/Ngr.
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The eﬀects of the demographic components on Y/Ngr can be studied by look-
ing at both their individual impacts on output growth and the corresponding eﬀect
of the interaction terms. To incorporate the eﬀect of the interaction terms, notice
that Y/N has been multiplied with each demographic component (see Model 2 and
Model 3, also Tables 1 and 2) so that the magnitude of the partial eﬀect of each
demographic term on per capita output growth, Y/Ngr, can be assessed. Consider
Model 1 (in Table 1). Though ngr and its interaction term (in this model) do not sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect Y/Ngr (individually), their joint impacts are found to be negatively
signiﬁcant (at the 0.05 level17). Conclusion about negative eﬀect of population on
Y/Ngr, following Model 1, at best provides preliminary gross assessments, as noth-
ing is revealed about its exact proﬁle of impact on Y/Ngr. For the purpose, ngr
has been segregated into diﬀerent components according to their resource using and
creating abilities. In Models 2 and 3 (Table 1), the results from this regression are
reported.
First, consider the eﬀect of CBR on Y/Ngr. The coeﬃcients of CBR and its
interaction term, CBR∗Y/N, in Model 2 (Table 1), are insigniﬁcant. In KS (1995),
page 551, the coeﬃcient of CBR has always been signiﬁcant which is a contrast to
our results. However, we ﬁnd joint signiﬁcance of CBR and its interaction term to
be negative which is the same as KS (1995)18. Intuitively, this means higher births
retard economic growth possibly though higher dependence of younger population
on economic resources which ultimately reduces savings and hence economic growth
via negative multiplier eﬀect.
To know the speciﬁc eﬀects of an increase (decrease) in CBR in case of devel-
oped and developing countries, let’s study col.2 of Table 4 where partial eﬀects of
diﬀerent demographic components on per capita output are reported. The partial
eﬀects are evaluated at (Y/N) medians of developed and developing countries (see
Table 3). The partial eﬀects are plotted in Figures 1 and 1a. Figure 1a presents a
comparison of our ﬁnding with KS (1995). Evidently, the comparison is made till
1990 since KS (1995) sample included the period 1960-1990. In Figure 1a, CBR-
own indicates our estimation and CBR-KS indicates KS (1995) result. Looking at
Figure 1a, it can be observed that the partial eﬀect of CBR in developing countries,
in contrast to KS (1995), is not monotonically declining over time. Our estimate
show a step-like pattern. Monotonic decline of the partial eﬀect of CBR for develop-
ing countries in KS (1995) means that higher births in succeeding decades in these
countries consistently and continuously impinge more harm on economic growth.
Step-like pattern of the partial eﬀect, as found in our case instead implies this is
not the case. There could be the eﬀect of some population policy which can cause
17the joint signiﬁcance test result is not reported in the table but are indicated as square bracket
over the respective demographic variable and its corresponding interaction term. The results can
be obtained from the author upon request.
18We have reproduced the KS (1995) table with our data set using three decennial periods. Table
6 in the appendix summarised KS (1995) ﬁndings.
17the eﬀect of CBR to be felt severely in some decades, but not consistenly for all the
decades together. I
In our case, the negative eﬀect of birth rise reached the lowest in the 1980s. An
upward trend (though negative) of the eﬀect in 1990-2000 implies that in future the
eﬀect of CBR can have positive eﬀect on per capita income growth for developing
countries. A forecast based on our estimates would imply so. The reason for the
step-like pattern could be as follows. Due to high investment in education and human
capital in the developing countries the recent years, the negative eﬀects of CBR may
recede over time. Moreover, the adoption of population control policy in developing
countries that began as early as 1960 and 1970s, did not register immediate impact
on economic growth. The possibility of revival in the 1990s contemplates the fact
that population control policy adopted earlier would bear some positive impact on
economic growth which might take another decade or so to completely settle in.
This empirical fact is much closer to the logic that depending on the nature of
the structural parameters of the economy (e.g., in our case it could be the social
environment and educational attainment of the population), a shock (in terms of
policy adoption for population control) intended to put the economy in a diﬀerent
path - might take a long time for the eﬀect to be felt. Indeed, this is the case with
population control policy too: the economy might have to wait a long time for the
full eﬀect to be internalised (see Dasgupta, 1995 for a discussion on these issues).
Within developed countries, eﬀect of CBR gives rise to some interesting fea-
tures. Beginning from high negative partial eﬀect of higher births in the 1970s, the
current decade (1990-2000) shows positive impact of CBR on developed countries
income growth. In view of KS (1995) ﬁnding, the negative impacts of higher births
seemed to recede over time, being ’fairly small’ in 1980-90, though it still remained
negative during the same decade (Figure 2a). From our cross-section estimation, we
ﬁnd that the eﬀect of birth rates have become positive for the developed countries
during the last decade (1990-2000). In view of the recent demographic changes in
the developed world, this contributory eﬀect of CBR is very important.
A possible reason for this trend can be laid as follows. Developed countries
experienced a huge drop in mortality and consequently followed a continuous and
steady decline in fertility. In most part of the European continent, as Boucekkine
et al. (2001) note, ”fertility has now reached or even fallen below the replacement
level”. Therefore, though ”the future scenario of zero population growth is consid-
ered seriously”, the ﬁnding of positive eﬀect of higher births for developed countries
in our study, calls for a re-examination of the hypothesi. It is nevertheless true that,
due to drastic fall in fertility level in the developed countries, along with an increase
in the schooling time, the ’replacement level’ of population must be substituted for
higher births. There is large literature that confounds this logic. At the simplest
level, it can be said that higher CBR in the countries experiencing higher fertility
is as dangerous as lower births in low fertility countries. The consequence being the
same, only the time proﬁle of eﬀects diﬀers.
Compensating for the negative overall eﬀect of higher births, a decrease in
CDR is expected to accelerate economic growth. Coeﬃcient of CDR in Model 2
18(Table 1) is not signiﬁcant though the signiﬁcant interaction term, CDR ∗ (Y/N),
as well as their joint signiﬁcance, summarises the partial negative eﬀect of CDR
on economic growth. The conclusion is strengthened when we consider the general
model (model 3, where the eﬀect of lagged birth rate (CBR−15) is incorporated).
As can be seen, both CDR and CDR ∗ (Y/N) exert signiﬁcant impact on Y/Ngr.
The ﬁnding of negative eﬀect of CDR implies that reduction in CDR will enhance
economic growth. But which country block (i.e., developing or developed) stand to
gain more from a further reduction of CDR? A close look at Table 4 and ﬁgures 3-4
provide some insights. Column 3 of Table 4 presents the partial eﬀect of CDR on per
capita income growth for both developed and developing countries. Figures 3 and
4 plot the eﬀects of CDR in both sets of countries. Additionally, to provide a com-
parison with KS (1995), Figures 3a and 4a represent the comparison for developing
and developed countries respectively.
To evaluate the partial eﬀect of CDR, ﬁrst begin with the case of developing
countries. A drop in median value of CDR from 0.985 (in 1980-90) to 0.765 (in
1990-2000) (see Table 3) in these countries was expected to increase output growth
per capita during the decades. As mentioned, this can be known from the partial
eﬀect of CDR reduction on per capita output. Considering the estimates from Table
4, the partial eﬀect of reducing CDR for developing countries during 1980-2000, in
fact improved per capita output. Even, if we compare our estimates for the period
1980-90 with that of KS (1995), a clear distinction emerges: the size of the eﬀect
of CDR on output growth in case of KS (1995) is smaller than our estimates(Table
4, col.3). Figures 3 and 3a provide a plot of these results). It is true that death
reductions in developing countries is mostly concentrated in younger and working
age people who by and large contribute to the output growth process.
Going by KS(1995) estimates, a still positive partial eﬀect can be expected
from death reductions in developing countries. Considering our estimates, this opti-
mism somehow fades in. As can be seen from Figures 3, and 3a, CDR reduction will
beneﬁt little to the developing countries at least in the short-run given the current
magnitude which is still negative. In case of developed countries, the positive eﬀect
of CDR reduction diminish over time following KS (1995), even becoming negative
during 1980-1990. The eﬀect of CDR reduction for 1990-2000 cane be seen from our
estimation (Table 4, col.3). We ﬁnd even large negative eﬀect of CDR during this
decade. This result gives another intuition to our earlier explanation why CBR has
contributed positively to the growth in the developed countries.
So far we discussed the eﬀect of CBR and CDR reductions on the growth of
output taking the case of both developed and developing nations. Another demo-
graphic factor which is also important is the lagged eﬀect of CBR, namely CBR−15
in our model. Generally, CBR−15 is likely to scale down the negative partial eﬀect
of CBR in the model (see Model 3) so that the net eﬀect of CBR can be correctly
speciﬁed. Going by our results, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of CBR−15 on
output growth per capita (Model 3, Table 1). In fact, our pooled estimation also
vindicates this ﬁnding (Table 1, col. 5). In KS (1995), initially starting from a
negative eﬀect in the 1960s, it latter became large and positive for the developing
19countries in the ensuing decades. Surprisingly, large negative eﬀect of CBR−15 is
found in our study for developing countries for all the decades, whereas for devel-
oped countries, the lagged birth rate contributed to per capita output growth in the
1980s, ﬁnally setting down to large negative value in 1990 (Figures 5a, 6a). It can
be said that the expected (positive) eﬀect of CBR−15 as per our estimation does
not show much promise as a catalyst for growth since its growth-enhancing eﬀect
could have very much been confused by the ’persistent high births’ in most of the
developing countries. The caveat here is that as the number of births keep on rising
every year, this ’persistent eﬀect’ becomes so large that it outweighs the eﬀect of
lagged birth rate (CBR−15 for those countries. Therefore, the growth-enhancing
eﬀect of CBR−15 may not be so prominent in developing countries in comparison
to the developed counterpart.
At the end we have performed a parameter constancy test for developed and
developing countries for the period 1960-2000. Table 5 reports the results of the
test. As can be observed, we reject the null hypothesis of non-constant parameters
during 1960-2000 for developed and developing countries.
6 Concluding remarks
Motivated by Kelley and Schmidt (1995, 2001) and Crenshaw et al. (1997) empir-
ical ﬁndings concerning the ’eﬀect of demographic components on economic devel-
opment’, we studied in this paper, how the weight of each component eﬀect has
changed over time. Extending Kelley and Schmidt (1995) data till 2000, (more pre-
cisely, including another decennial period in the model), we showed that the weight
of the eﬀect of demographic components have changed over the last four decades.
Most important conclusions of this paper are: (i) there is little gain to expect from
further reductions in mortality in the developing countries. Mortality reductions in
these countries are heavily concentrated among children, which is costly in terms of
economies output. With higher and persistent birth rates the eﬀort to materialise
the positive eﬀect of mortality reductions in the developing countries can do no more
good. In eﬀect, the national governments in these countries should control for the
momentum of persistent high birth rate eﬀects.
(ii) Despite the fact that higher birth rates retard economic progress in devel-
oping countries, interestingly the same may not be true for developed nations. We
found that the eﬀect of CBR has become positive in the developed countries in the
recent decade. This ﬁnding can be put into perspective given that the future of zero
population growth as optimum for higher economic growth is considered nowadays
by some researchers (Boucekkine et al. 2002). Given the recent trend of demo-
graphic transitions and declining fertility level in these countries, economic growth
may in fact get slowly paced. A positive eﬀect of CBR as found in our paper in
fact provides an interesting and healthy sign for economic growth. (iii) The eﬀect
of CDR in the developed countries is very large in all the decades - larger during
the current decade (1990-2000). As we know, death rate reductions contribute pos-
20itively to economic growth in each decade. During the last decade, the eﬀect seems
to be quite large. Important to note that unlike developing countries, death rate
reductions in the developed countries are concentrated not only among younger gen-
erations but most importanly among the working age people. Hence, as the greater
the number of working age people, the faster is the economic progress.
(iv) Another contribution of the paper is the ﬁnding of vanishing positive
eﬀect of population density. Though under common country intercepts (pooled
estimation), a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of density was observed, in the span of
four decades, the growth-enhancing role of density found in our paper has only been
limited to the sixties.
The ﬁnding of large negative partial eﬀect of CBR in developing country for
the past decade can be put both in historical and theoretical perspectives: given
poor resource base, higher birth rate (accumulated over time from successive higher
birth rates in the past) will put the developing countries economic prosperity into
dismay. The eﬀect of population policies aimed at controlling birth rate reductions
in developing nations, will take time to make the positive eﬀects being felt. Since
these countries historically suﬀer from past high population growth, the rate of
accumulation of lagged birth rate (CBR-15) might have been slower in the 1970s
and 1980s and the net eﬀect of CBR could have less than an oﬀsetting amount.
The period 1990s experienced a slackening eﬀect of lagged birth rate both in case of
developing and developed countries especially in the last decade. This is in contrast
to KS (1995) ﬁnding: in case of developing countries, the favorable eﬀect of past
births starting from 1970s continued to be positive till 1990s, while the eﬀect turned
out to be negative during 1970-90s for developed nations. Overall it seems that the
impact of lagged birth rate in the last decade is highly increased both in developed
and developing country economies. Our estimates show that the favorable eﬀect of
lagged birth rate is felt only in 1980s in case of developed countries, while the eﬀect
tended to be negative for developing nations over time. The short-term costs of high
birth rates has been increasingly felt by developing countries over past four decades.
Mortality reductions in those countries (concentrated mainly on infants) showed a
sign of improvement though still remained negative till date.
Finally a note on the model and assumption is in order. Notice that through-
out the paper we assumed stationarity of the demographic variables. Consequently,
a stationary panel method was used for estimation. However, recent research (Gil
Alana, 2003) shows that population can possess a kind of memory property or long-
range dependence. With stationary assumption all inherent dynamics of the process
is assumed out. However, allowing for memory structure to prevail in population
variable shows high degree of memory which of course aﬀects other variables like per
capita output growth. Hence the time series eﬀect of demographic variables must
be taken into account which is disregarded in stationary panels.
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24Table 1: KS Extended Model: Dependent Variable, (Y/Ngr)
Panel Estimation: Fixed eﬀect model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Pooled
Ln(Y/N) -2.389(-3.66) -2.567(-2.15) -3.55(-2.58) -0.115(-0.184)
Ngr ⌈ −0.409(−1.00) ⌉
Ngr*(Y/N) ⌊−0.025(−0.728)⌋
CBR ⌈ −0.544(−0.853) ⌉ ⌈ −0.334(−0.504) ⌉ -0.272(-0.785)
CBR*(Y/N) ⌊−0.100(−1.44)⌋ ⌊−0.120(−1.75)⌋ -0.042(-0.732)
CBR−15 ⌈ −1.05(−3.08) ⌉ -0.901(-3.24)
CBR−15 ∗ (Y/N) ⌊0.049(0.817)⌋ -0.019(-0.502)
CDR ⌈ −0.884(−1.38) ⌉ ⌈ −1.22(−2.12) ⌉ -0.571(-1.14)
CDR*(Y/N) ⌊0.186(2.50)⌋ ⌊0.163(2.16)⌋ -0.094(-1.52)
Density 0.719(1.36) 0.740(1.69) 0.281(0.567) 0.614(8.23)
Constant 8.61(6.63) 11.06(4.16) 14.63(4.44) 7.47(5.49)
R2 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.20
Std. Error (σ) 2.057 2.052 2.01 2.05
No. of Observations 343 343 343 343
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses (at 0.05 level)
Square brackets over two variables indicate joint signiﬁcance at 0.05 level
Table 2: Cross-Section Estimation (Model 3): Dependent Variable, (Y/Ngr)
1960-70 1970-80 1980-90 1990-2000
Ln(Y/N) -0.133(-0.136) 1.219(1.064) -2.653(-2.90) -1.615(-1.313)
CBR -0.346(-0.393) 0.902(1.182) -1.549(-2.623) -1.658(-1.712)
CBR*(Y/N) 0.031(0.108) -0.279(-1.75) -0.025(-0.229) 0.142(0.923)
CBR−15 -0.468(-0.679) -0.525(-0.792) -0.545(-0.997) -0.840(-1.031)
CBR−15 ∗ (Y/N) -0.040(-0.197) 0.033(0.291) 0.052(0.574) -0.031(-0.231)
CDR -1.066(-1.272) -2.864(-3.13) -1.259(-1.548) 0.305(0.315)
CDR*(Y/N) -0.176(-0.704) 0.043(0.267) 0.065(0.607) -0.200(-1.69)
Density 1.01(2.37) 0.634(1.474) 0.527(1.522) -0.027(-0.100)
Constant 8.033(4.217) 5.492(2.26) 11.340(5.405) 10.395(3.643)
R2 0.37 0.38 0.48 0.27
Adj.R2 0.31 0.31 0.43 0.19
Std. Error (σ) 1.65 1.82 1.57 2.05
No. of Observations 86 86 86 86
Note: Bracketed values are t-statistics at 5 per cent level
Table 3: Variable Medians
Years Y/Ngr Y/N Density Ngr CBR CDR CBR−15
Developing Countries
1960-70 2.074 1.628 0.026 2.654 4.559 1.880 3.852
1970-80 1.491 2.018 0.033 2.627 4.345 1.479 3.869
1980-90 -0.028 2.634 0.041 2.541 4.032 0.985 3.762
1990-2000 0.872 2.851 0.057 2.301 3.285 0.765 4.244
Developed Countries
1960-70 3.455 7.801 0.088 0.811 1.829 0.960 1.881
1970-80 2.532 12.085 0.091 0.847 1.523 0.976 1.774
1980-90 1.864 15.782 0.092 0.444 1.268 0.948 1.659
1990-2000 1.524 19.813 0.096 0.430 1.269 0.932 1.415
25Table 4: Partial Derivatives Evaluated at (Y/N) Medians
Years CBR CDR CBR−15
Developing Countries
1960-70 -0.295 -1.352 -0.533
1970-80 0.338 -2.78 -0.458
1980-90 -1.614 -1.09 -0.408
1990-2000 -1.253 -0.265 -0.928
Developed Countries
1960-70 -0.104 -2.439 -0.780
1970-80 -2.470 -2.344 -0.126
1980-90 -1.944 -0.233 0.276
1990-2000 1.155 -3.658 -1.454
Table 5: Parameter Constancy Test
χ2 Prob.≻ χ2
All Countries 15.18 0.018
Developing Countries 25.26 0.003
Developed Countries 15.60 0.016
262728Appendix
A. Calculation of Partial Derivatives
The partial derivatives reported in Table 4 are calculated in the following way.
Recall Model 3 (equation 6) of Section 3:
(Y/Ngr)t = αi + ηt + β ln(Y/N)it + δ1(CBR)it + δ2(CBR ∗ Y/N)it + δ3(CBR−15)it+
δ4(CBR−15 ∗ Y/N)it + δ5(CDR)it + δ6(CDR ∗ Y/N)it + θ(Density)it + εit
(9)
Table 2 reports the cross section estimates of this regression (for four decennial
periods). Given those parameter estimates, our purpose is to ﬁnd the partial deriva-
tives of (Y/Ngr)t with respect to the variable vector X = (CBR,CDR,CBRL).
For instance, in case of CBR, the partial derivative is simply calculated as:
∂(Y/Ngr)i(t,t+n)
∂CBRit
= ˆ δ1 + ˆ δ2 ∗ Median(Y/N)it (10)
In the same way, the partial derivatives for CDR and CBRL could be found
using the format above. Since we are interested in comparing the partial derivatives
of developing and developed countries, we have used the median of Y/N separately
for those two sets of countries.
B. Conﬁdence band for estimates of partial derivatives
Denote the estimate of the partial derivative of say, CBR (at period t and for
the set of countries belonging to developing nations) as Pst, where s = (1, 2) and t
= (1960-70, 1970-80, 1980-90, 1990-2000).
Conﬁdence band of Pst at 95 percent signiﬁcance level (given its mean, ¯ Pst,
and standard deviation, σP) is




N = 23 for developed and 63 for developing countries. ¯ Pst is assumed to be the same
as the estimated ˆ Pst as






V ar(ˆ δ1) + V ar(ˆ δ2) ∗ (Median(Y/N))2 + 2Median(Y/N)Cov( ˆ δ1, ˆ δ2)
29C: KS Basic Table (Three Decennial Periods Estimation)
Table 6: KS Basic Model: Dependent Variable, (Y/Ngr)
Panel Estimation: Fixed eﬀect model Cross-Sectional Estimation:
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Pooled
Ln(Y/N) -3.67(-4.48) -6.018(-4.13) -5.977(-4.11) -0.156(-0.301)
Ngr -0.444(-0.991)
Ngr*(Y/N) -0.0406(-0.824)
CBR -1.741(-2.99) -1.672(-2.65) -0.690(-1.54)
CBR*(Y/N) -0.032(-0.418) -0.005(-0.066) 0.005(0.085)
CBR-15 -0.274(-0.491) -0.226(0.503)
CBR-15*(Y/N) -0.066(-1.03) -0.097(-2.01)
CDR -0.940(-0.913) -1.137(-1.13) -0.689(-1.56)
CDR*(Y/N) 0.340(3.00) 0.404(3.57) -0.014(-0.210)
Density 2.096(3.69) 2.523(3.90) 3.157(3.95) 0.980(6.21)
Constant 9.719 18.05 19.22 7.049
R-square 0.68 0.7 0.71 0.23
Note: Bracketed values are t-statistics
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